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Introduction
Scholarship on post-disaster recovery has long argued that a combination of factors, such as a community's resources, its organizational capacities, its social class and ethnicity, and the public or private financial assistance programmes to which it has access, impact recovery outcomes among communities (Vatsa, 2004; Berke, Kartez, & Wenger, 1993; Siembieda, 2002; Blaikie et al., 1994; Bates, Killian & Peacock, 1984) . More recently, research on the role of social capital in disasters posits that the presence of social capital can increase the ability of communities to recover after disasters through collective action (Aghabakhshi & Gregor, 2007; Aldrich, 2012; Chamlee-Wright, 2006; Dynes, 2006; Ganapati, 2012; George, 2007; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004) , implying that the presence of social capital ensures collective community action after a disaster and enables recovery. Social capital, according to Putnam (2000) , refers to the value embedded in social networks and the tendency of these networks towards collective action, based on shared values, interests, trust, and norms.
This study examines the use of social capital for post-disaster housing recovery among caste communities in Bhuj and Bachhau, urban centres close to the epicentre of the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat state in India, in order to present a more nuanced view of the role of social capital during disaster recovery. Drawing from a qualitative analysis of community initiatives for housing recovery needs, the study demonstrates that while there were strong bonding networks based on mutual trust and solidarity in most communities in Bhuj and Bachhau, this did not necessarily lead to collective action in all communities. Moreover, the amount of bonding-based social capital available, which according to Bourdieu (1986) is bound up with the financial, educational and experiential resources held by others in one's networks, differed among communities in both towns as it depended upon the pre-disaster networks of a community and the resources embedded in them. Yet, a small number of communities in Bachhau were able to overcome their lack of collective action and limited amount of bonding-based social capital when the disaster triggered the formation of outward-looking linking social capital through the emergence of new networks between them and local non-government organizations (NGOs). The newly formed linking networks provided these communities access to public assistance and resources that enabled their housing recovery.
The significance of this study lies in its theoretical and empirical scope. Theoretically, scholars and practitioners in the hazards field increasingly use social capital as an analytical framework to examine community recovery after disasters. The article argues that in doing so it is important to consider community contexts that are inherent to the amount of social capital available and use of resources through social networks. Empirically, the article presents a nuanced view of the role of social capital during disaster recovery, arguing that the presence of bonding social capital does not necessarily always translate to effective collective action. Also, the amount of bonding-based social capital available to communities can vary depending on the size, type and forms of their pre-disaster networks. Lastly, a disaster can trigger the formation of outward-looking linking capital that can overcome the absence of collective action and the limited amount of bonding-based social capital through the emergence of new networks and the resources embedded in them. The findings of this study are highly relevant to civil society and public policy debates on the mobilization and use of social capital for post-disaster recovery. Understanding the nuances of collective community action for housing recovery after disasters is a critical first step toward crafting appropriate programmes that can adequately meet a community's housing needs and guard against ineffective one-size-fits-all policy solutions.
Social Capital and Disaster Recovery: A Review
Over the last three decades, social capital as a concept has drawn increasing attention from scholars and practitioners across disciplines (DeFilippis, 2002; Fine, 2008; Woolcock, 2010) . The concept itself that sees value in social networks can be traced back to the works of scholars such as Canadian sociologist John Seeley, economist Glenn Loury, urbanist Jane Jacobs, and German economist Ekkehart Schlicht (Putnam, 2002; Woolcock, 2010) . In particular, social theorist Pierre Bourdieu (1986) , sociologist James C. Coleman (1988) , and political scientist Robert Putnam (Putnam et al., 1993; Putnam, 2000 Putnam, , 1995 have significantly influenced its theoretical development. The actual definition of the term social capital, however, varies among scholars. For instance, Coleman (1988) argues that social capital is something that facilitates individual or collective action generated by some aspect of the social structure (e.g., networks of relationships, reciprocity, trust). Putnam (2002 Putnam ( , 2000 and Putnam et al. (1993) has defined social capital as the collective value of all social networks, based on shared values, norms (e.g., reciprocity), and trust and the inclination of these networks to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives in the social, political, or economic realms. Putnam's use of social capital is fundamentally different from that of Bourdieu and Coleman because 'he transforms it from something embedded in groups and social networks but realized by individuals -as it was used by Coleman and Bourdieu -to something that is realized by either individuals or groups, or cities, or nations' (DeFilippis, 2002, p. 792) . Nan Lin (2001) identifies social capital as an investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace, or more recently as 'resources embedded in one's social networks, resources that can be accessed or mobilized through ties in the networks' (Lin & Erickson, 2008, p. 51) . While the definitions of social capital remain broad, the basic idea behind the concept is similar -that social networks, based upon shared values, norms, and trust, matter.
The literature identifies three aspects of social capital that characterize networks and relationships among individuals (Putnam, 2002 (Putnam, , 2000 Woolcock, 2002; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000) . The first, bonding social capital is based on social networks between immediate family members, neighbours and close friends who share similar demographic characteristics. Bonding social capital is inward looking and can reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups. The second, bridging social capital is based on social networks among diverse groups of people, such as colleagues and acquaintances from different demographic, geographical, and occupational backgrounds. Bridging social capital is outward looking and more inclusive (Putnam, 2002 (Putnam, , 2000 Woolcock, 2002; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000) . The third, linking social capital is based on networks that have the 'capacity to leverage resources, ideas and information from formal institutions beyond the community, most notably the State' (Woolcock, 2002: 23) . Woolcock and Narayan (2000) observe that the poor tend to have strong bonding and some level of bridging social capital, but little linking social capital.
The above three distinctions make the point that all social capital is not the same, since some can span social divisions, whereas other types can contribute to existing divisions. According to Bourdieu, the amount of social capital available to an individual depends not only on the size and type of one's personal networks but on the volume of other forms of capital, notably economic and cultural, possessed by those to whom one is connected. This understanding emphasizes that social capital does not accrue in isolation but rather is bound up with the financial, educational and experiential resources held by others in one's networks. The implication is that social capital not only "binds" and "bridges" groups; it also reinforces and reproduces social inequalities that separate and define them. (as quoted in Elliott et al., 2010, p. 627) Although Fine (2008, p. 446) criticizes the categories, stating that 'the problem is that bonding, bridging and linking cut across the traditional variables of social theory -such as class, gender, race and so on -and, as a result, overlook that one person's bond is another person's bridge'. Such societal tensions cannot be ignored simply by reducing their complexity into 'the otherwise neutral categories of bonding, bridging and linking.' Yet, the three distinctions of social capital types serve as a useful analytical framework in this article and are utilized to analyse structures of networks and social inequalities that can divide and connect individuals and communities.
In the hazards field, the scholarship increasingly focuses on social capital mobilization for community recovery after catastrophic events. Studies show that disasters can trigger the formation of new social capital among impacted communities through the emergence of civic networks (Ganapati, 2009 (Ganapati, , 2005 , strengthen civil society (Shaw & Goda, 2004) , and enhance resilience to risk (Brouwer & Nhassengo, 2006) and hazard through community emergency management (Murphy, 2007) . Moreover, 'social capital serves as the primary base for a community response' (Dynes, 2005: 7) , mitigates damage caused by disasters through collective action (Yamamura, 2010) , increases the ability of communities to recover after disasters through collective action (Aldrich, 2012; Chamlee-Wright, 2006; Dynes, 2006; George, 2007; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004) , sustains communities through changes after a disaster (Aghabakhshi & Gregor, 2007; Ganapati, 2012) , offers immediate support and pathways to long-term survival and community revitalization (Hawkins & Maurer, 2010) , and facilitates organizational recovery (Doerfel, Lai & Chewning, 2010) .
In the arena of post-disaster housing recovery, the literature on the impacts of social capital is relatively sparse. Bolin and Stanford (1991) have argued that access to social support networks is a significant predictor of housing recovery outcomes at the household level. Other studies show that the internal and external capacities of a community prior to a disaster are important in determining the post-disaster housing recovery levels of a community (Berke, Kartez, & Wenger, 1993) . A high degree of internal capacity can provide a community with a tightly knit social network of local organizations through which people can organize and have the opportunity to participate collectively in local decision-making processes. A high degree of external capacities links a community with larger political, social, and economic institutions, which in turn helps the community to expand its resources, such as funding, credit, or other forms of public or private assistance, during post-disaster housing recovery (Berke, Kartez, & Wenger, 1993; Siembieda, 2002) .
Though the scholarship on the use of social capital for disaster recovery predominantly discusses its beneficial impacts, the concept itself is increasingly contested within larger social capital research, which critiques it as a cure-all concept of self-help wrapped in the language of community empowerment and challenges the tendency to focus solely on its positive aspects (Fine, 2008; Portes, 1998; Woolcock, 2010) . Bourdieu (1986) , Coleman (1990) and Lin (2001 Lin ( , 2000 argue that while social capital can be a useful resource, it is not equally available to all people because it functions through social systems of inequality. Scholars also contend that social capital is not created equally, but rather depends on the socio-economic position of the source (Edwards & Foley, 1997 Wetterberg, 2004) and that the concept fails to consider the impact of class and historically embedded power relations within a society on the capacities of communities to participate in or take collective action (Harriss, 2002) , which in turn leads to a lack of emphasis in social capital theory for social change (Fine, 2001) . DeFilippis (2002) argues that social capital is a fundamentally flawed concept because it fails to understand issues of power in the production of communities. Moreover, scholars (Portes, 1998; Portes & Landolt, 1996) have pointed out that the very same elements, such as trust and networks, which form the basis of social capital could cause negative consequences, such as exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group members that create downward levelling norms, and restrictions on individual freedom. The underlying point these criticisms make is that there are different types, levels or dimensions of social capital that require a more dynamic than static understanding of the concept (Woolcock, 1998) .
Empirical research in the hazards field is beginning to do just that. In a study examining trailer siting in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, Aldrich and Crook (2008) observed the contradictions inherent within civil society, concluding that strong local civil society can act as a 'dual-edged sword' because it helped refugees returning to their communities in New Orleans but, at the same time, did not support the citywide process of rebuilding. In a separate study of two unequal sets of residents in New Orleans impacted by Hurricane Katrina, Elliott and his colleagues demonstrated that, local network capacities of less advantaged residents of Lower Ninth Ward relative to those of the more affluent Lakeview neighborhood dissipated before, during, and after the disaster to erode the life chances of individual residents and the neighborhood they once constituted. (Elliott et al., 2010, p. 624) Similarly, in a study of villages in Tamil Nadu, India following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Aldrich (2011, p. 1) showed that 'high levels of social capital simultaneously provided strong benefits and equally strong negative externalities, especially to those already on the periphery of society.' While high levels of social capital reduced barriers to collective action and sped up recovery for some groups, at the same time it reinforced obstacles to recovery for marginalized groups such as Dalits (lower caste), migrants, women, and Muslims.
However, few studies have looked at how factors such as class and caste play a role in the mobilization of social capital during post-disaster recovery. A recent study by Aldrich (2010 Aldrich ( , p. 1369 ) measured the 'causal influence of caste, location, wealth and bridging social capital on the receipt of post-disaster aid,' concluding that 'caste, family status, and wealth are powerful predictors of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries' during the aid distribution process. Bosher and his colleagues noted that 'caste is the key factor in determining who has assets, who can access public facilities, who has political connections and who has supportive social networks. The "lower" castes (which tend to be the poorest) are marginalized to the extent that they lack access to assets, public facilities and opportunities to improve their plight. (Bosher et al., 2007, p. 615) This study situates itself within the above context, contributing to three main areas in the scholarship where the literature is relatively thin. First, the scholarship on the use of social capital for disaster recovery predominantly discusses its beneficial impacts, with only a handful of studies that present a more dynamic understanding of the concept. This article presents a more complex view of social capital during post-disaster recovery. Second, the article looks at the use of social capital for housing recovery after disasters, an area that is relatively unexplored in the literature even though scholars (Comerio, 1998) argue that future disasters are likely to have an enormous impact on urban housing and that housing represents the largest segment of the cost of post-disaster recovery. Third, the article uses a caste community as its unit of analysis, an approach that contributes to an understanding of structures of networks and socio-economic inequalities but is relatively absent in the current scholarship.
Methodology
This study employed data gathered through the author's extensive field research in Bhuj and Bachhau, two urban areas close to the epicentre of the 2001 Gujarat earthquake in western India. The research design itself had two components. The first component looked at caste communities in both Bhuj and Bachhau individually to examine collective action initiatives and the use of bonding, bridging and linking social capital in each community for post-disaster housing recovery. The unit of analysis was the caste community. The second component of the research used comparative analysis to examine the emergence of new linking social capital following the disaster. Bhuj and Bachhau are considered as appropriate sites for this research because both share similar conditions in terms of demographic and caste composition, economic condition, scale of earthquake damage and social capital levels (i.e., both consist of communities with strong bonding capital networks and weak bridging capital). However, while the disaster triggered the formation of linking social capital between local NGOs and squatter communities in Bachhau that was employed for housing recovery, no such processes were observed in Bhuj. The two cities thus offer a comparative opportunity to examine the emergence of post-disaster linking social capital and how the emergence of new linking networks enabled a small subset of communities to access resources for housing recovery and to overcome their lack of collective action and limited bonding-based social capital.
Fieldwork for this study was carried out over a period of seven months from September 2004 to April 2005. Qualitative data were collected through field observations and informant interviews. The primary data collection method was semi-structured, in-depth interviews conducted in the local language (i.e., Gujarati, Hindi) with NGOs, journalists, public officials, and leaders of 19 caste communities in Bhuj and 17 in Bachhau. Interviewees were identified in multiple ways. Public officials involved in disaster recovery efforts were identified through multiple visits to local and state government offices. Lists of NGOs and caste community leaders were made after speaking with local journalists and citizen groups. Interviewees varied widely with regard to their education levels (e.g., college educated professionals to community leaders with no formal education) and professions (e.g., public officials to unemployed day labourers).
The interviews took place in government offices, NGO offices, community offices, community members' homes, and other locations convenient to the interviewees. An emergent sampling technique was used during the interviews, whereby groups are interviewed until no new insights or information is obtained. Each interview, lasting from a half-hour to one hour, was recorded with the permission of the interviewee and translated and transcribed verbatim into a Microsoft Word document. The interview data were then coded into conceptual categories by using matrices in MS Excel. A total of 42 interviews were conducted in Bhuj and 38 in Bachhau. Table 1 shows the distribution of interviewees. Though it is beyond the scope of this article to delve into the complexities of the caste system in India, briefly, according to Diane Mines (2009, p. 75 ) caste … is not a coherent system that exists all over India and by which all Indians abide. It is not a set of precut categories into which people place themselves like rungs on an immovable ladder. Nor is it an "ancient tradition" set beside more modern realities. Rather, caste is a changing constellation of values, actions, ideas, and organizing principles that most Indians engage with in one way or another in their daily lives. Caste is a product of complex histories and exists today in multiple forms.
At the local level, castes are small endogamous groups with the same name. On a regional level, castes are clusters of local castes. At the state or national levels, castes are clusters of regional clusters. All these three groups are called jatis in Indian languages. In government publications such as the Census of India or the lists used for affirmative action, the term jati (nyati in Gujarat or jati elsewhere in India) refers to regional or state-level caste clusters. To combat the severe socio-economic exploitation of low status groups (e.g., Dalits, considered untouchables) over the centuries (detailed in Human Rights Watch, 2007) , the Constitution of India identifies three broad categories that are eligible for affirmative action in the arena of legislative representation, education, and public employment: The Scheduled Castes (SC), the Scheduled Tribes (ST), and the Other Backward Classes (OBC). The SC category includes the Dalits or untouchable jatis; the ST category includes aboriginal tribes and groups; and the OBC category includes jatis that are deemed socially and educationally backward. The government uses the term Forward Classes (FC) for jatis not eligible for affirmative action. The lack of a precise definition of eligibility criteria for a caste or tribe to be included in any one of these groups has led to some arbitrariness in the lists and subjected the lists to debates and changes over time (Cassan, 2011) . For the purposes of this study, these government categories are considered appropriate for use as each community interviewed at the case study sites identified with and often discussed their placement in the government-constructed categories.
For each nyati in Bhuj and Bachhau one or two leaders were identified for interviews. While the total number of nyatis in Bhuj and Bachhau is higher than the 19 and 17 respectively interviewed for this study, the communities interviewed comprise some of the largest nyati groups living in Bhuj and Bachhau and are representative of the existing socio-economic strata. It was beyond the scope of the fieldwork to interview every nyati community in Bhuj and Bachhau. As a result, nyati groups with fewer than 40 households were not included in the interview list. Table 2 provides a list of all the 19 nyatis interviewed for this study in Bhuj and the 17 in Bachhau. The nyatis are listed according to the total number of households, from the highest to the lowest in descending order. A socio-economic profile of each community was created through data on the level of education, monthly income range of households, homeownership percentage, and pre-disaster community resources. These data are displayed in Table 2 . The interviews gathered data on social capital before and after the disaster at the community level in Bhuj and Bachhau that included social capital within a nyati community (bonding), among different nyati communities (bridging), and between nyati communities and other institutions and organizations that are external to the nyati groups (linking). Bonding social capital was assessed through the number of formal organizations or informal groups in a community and the length of their presence and activities, in particular the presence of a formal active nyati mandal (caste association) headed by a nyati panch (caste council), the percentage of households enrolled as members in the nyati mandal, the number of social or religious events organized by the nyati mandal annually, attendance levels of nyati households at event gatherings, levels of trust and recognition among nyati households, community efforts to build or maintain a samajwadi (community centre), and nyati mandal connections with regional, national or international level associations, charitable organizations, and groups related to the nyati community. Bridging social capital was assessed through connections among nyati mandals from different communities, the number of joint events by nyati mandals, interactions among nyati panch members, levels of trust and recognition among members of different nyatis, and the number of formal or informal external groups that are subscribed by members of multiple nyatis. Linking social capital was assessed through nyati panch interactions with public officials or private entities (e.g., banks, charitable organizations, NGOs) outside their nyati networks.
Study Context
On the morning of January 26, 2001, as India was celebrating its 51 st annual national republic day, a 7.7 Mw earthquake with its epicentre in Kutch -a little known, remote region close to the Pakistan border -hit the state of Gujarat in western India. The epicentre was 20 kilometres (12 miles) northeast of Bhuj city, the administrative headquarters of Kutch district, located in northwest Gujarat. Approximately 13,800 people died and 167,000 were injured. The earthquake also flattened approximately 230,000 housing units and damaged another 1 million in Gujarat state (GSDMA, 2004) .
Urban housing damage was most severe in Bhuj and Bachhau, the study sites for this research. According to the Gujarat government's post-disaster housing damage survey, Bhuj, a city of more than 136,000 people (Government of India, 2001), had close to 50,000 housing units prior to the earthquake, of which over 13,000 collapsed completely and 24,000 were damaged. In all, about 75 percent of houses in Bhuj were either destroyed or damaged in the earthquake. In Bachhau, a town of more than 25,000 people (Government of India, 2001), the housing damage was more severe. The town had over 13,000 buildings prior to the earthquake, of which 10,000 were residential. With 9,000 homes destroyed, Bachhau lost nearly 90 percent of its housing stock in the earthquake. The remaining 10 percent of homes suffered heavy damage and were rendered uninhabitable.
Under the Gujarat state government's urban housing recovery programme, homeowners were eligible for public financial assistance to rebuild or repair their houses. The amount of assistance was calculated based on loss, which depended upon the extent of housing damage as assessed by government survey teams, and it was released over two or three instalments. The government survey teams categorized housing damage into five groups from G1 to G5, with G1 being houses with minor cracks and G5 being complete collapse. Public financial assistance for homeowners ranged from 8,000 rupees (US $190) for houses in the G1 category to 150,000 rupees (US $3,571) for houses in the G5 category.
Yet, certain components of the public assistance programme, particularly the ones concerned with eligibility requirements, were highly unclear, causing much confusion and discrepancy during programme implementation. While a public financial assistance scheme for homeowners was initiated based on property loss assessment, housing assistance to renters and squatters was either non-existent or not well defined. These uncertainties left numerous gaps in terms of housing assistance needs particularly among low-income homeowners, renters, and squatter households (Mukherji, 2010) . In the context of such vital public assistance gaps, this study examined how communities in Bhuj and Bachhau mobilized and used their social capital to meet housing needs.
Bonds, Bridges, Links for Housing Recovery
There are three main findings of this research. First, communities in Bhuj and Bachhau predominantly displayed strong bonding but weak bridging networks at the community level, and the presence of bonding social capital did not necessarily always translate into effective collective action. Second, the amount of social capital available through bonding networks differed among communities in both towns, depending upon the pre-disaster networks of a community and the resources embedded in them. Third, the disaster triggered the formation of outward-looking linking capital among a small number of communities in Bachhau comprised of low-income squatter households through the emergence of new networks with local nongovernment organizations. The new networks provided access to previously unavailable public assistance and resources for housing recovery that helped the squatter communities overcome the absence of collective action and the limited amount of bonding-based social capital.
Strong Bonding, Some Collective Action, and Weak Bridges
Bonding networks based on trust and solidarity within a majority of the communities interviewed in both Bhuj and Bachhau are strong. This was indicated by the presence of a formal nyati mandal in each community, 95-100 percent household enrolment in the nyati mandals, strong attendance at event gatherings organized by the nyati panch, and high levels of trust and recognition among nyati households. Indeed, each nyati group in Bhuj and Bachhau has a nyati mandal (caste association) whose members comprise households belonging to the nyati. The nyati mandal is overseen by a nyati panch (caste council), constituted locally by predominantly male community members of the nyati. Nyati panch are the keepers of social order in their nyati, providing leadership and management of community resources (i.e., land, property, and finances), organizing religious and social events, settling disputes among members, and determining matrimonial issues and alliances. Following the disaster, nyati panchs in Bhuj and Bachhau played leadership roles in their communities and were often the key to collective action initiatives.
Pre-disaster strong bonding networks led to collective action among some communities. For instance, it enabled 10 out of 19 nyati communities interviewed in Bhuj to take collective action to meet their temporary housing needs. In each of these 10 nyatis, disaster-impacted households agreed to hand over their entire temporary housing public assistance checks (12,000 rupees per household; US $285) to their nyati panch in order to pool the funds and to construct their units together at one location. Each nyati panch then arranged for the construction of mass temporary housing units for participating households using the pooled funds. This allowed for higher quality, cost-effective, and well-designed units suited to the needs of community members. Moreover, in Bhuj, the Gujarat state government had designated the GIDC (Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation) location, a large piece of barren public land on the city's industrial outskirts, as a temporary housing site. The site was divided into 19 housing sectors and was occupied by almost 1,500 households at its peak occupancy. Each nyati panch whose members had pooled their temporary housing assistance built its temporary housing units at the GIDC site, and clustered together closely so that member households could live in proximity and maintain community bonds. For instance, 'in GIDC the ninth sector was ours,' stated a Darji Sahi Suthar nyati panch member during the interview, explaining that they built 120 housing units in sector nine and named it the Darji Colony.
Of the remaining nine out of 19 nyati communities in Bhuj, three were pre-dominantly squatters and did not receive temporary shelter assistance. Despite strong bonding networks, the remaining six nyati groups in Bhuj did not display collective action initiatives for temporary housing needs after the disaster. Interviews indicate that the nyati panch in these communities were relatively less active, and without their leadership community members were unable to organize for temporary housing initiatives. Lack of leadership and/or lack of financial resources were cited as two primary reasons for inactivity, as was disorganization among some nyati panchs after the disaster. For instance, a Darbar nyati member in Bhuj explained: …No, there was no help [from the Darbar nyati]…We have a community Pramukh (President) he is an MLA [Member of State Legislative Assembly] from our community but he is not very strong. Otherwise we even had community land. For example, the Luhana nyati have Raghuvanshi Nagar, they developed it and made houses…they got land for Raghuvanshi Nagar the community petitioned for it…our Darbar community did not try anything like this.
Furthermore, a Sindhi nyati member from Bhuj described the lack of resources in the community:
…Our Sindhi community here could not do anything because we had no money to spend on those people [impacted by the disaster]. Our entire money, we have a community centre, and just before the earthquake we had invested all our money in that. We got construction done for second floor. Whatever money we had left we put it in that. We had not even inaugurated it and the earthquake came, so we were penniless.
The interviews also document that bridging capital networks at the community level in both Bhuj and Bachhau are weak. There was only one example of community-level bridging social capital between the Bhanusali and the Jain nyatis in Bhuj that was utilized for post-disaster housing. The Bhanusali nyati panch in Bhuj built 92 temporary housing units for member households. These units were funded partly by the Jain nyati diaspora living abroad, who paid 500,000 rupees (US $11,904) to build them. The Shri Kutchi Seva Bhanusali Trust, a national level Bhanusali community organization based in Mumbai, gave another 500,000 rupees (US $11,904) towards the temporary housing. Other instances of bridging capital networks mentioned during interviews were between individuals rather than at the community level. For instance, Vanad nyati households in Bhuj are traditionally barbers by occupation and their profession brings them into contact with people from other nyati groups. A Vanad nyati member explained that individual Vanad households were able to borrow funds from members of other nyatis who formed their network of professional contacts and acquaintances based upon years of client and customer relationships:
…Due to a twist of fate our community can manage to get the money for the land on credit... [chuckles] . The business is such that there are all kinds of clients. If you are coming to me for 5-7 years to cut your hair so you are familiar with me. So if I ask you for 7,000 rupees [US $166] I would get it. So most people who have gone to the relocation sites have taken money on credit [from clients/customers].
Resources Embedded in Nyati Networks
Although almost all nyati communities demonstrate strong bonding networks, the amount of social capital available through the bonding networks differed among nyatis in both towns, depending upon the resources embedded in their networks. Nyati communities that were socioeconomically strong, as indicated by high monthly household income range, homeownership rates, and levels of education, also had a higher amount of social capital available through their bonding networks, compared to communities that were socioeconomically weak. As noted above, Table 2 shows the socioeconomic profile of each community interviewed in Bhuj and Bachhau. Higher incomes and education coincide with a higher percent of homeownership (i.e., 90 percent and above), while lower income and education coincide with a higher percentage of squatter households (i.e., 90 percent and above).
Socioeconomically strong communities had more resources embedded in their bonding networks (i.e., money, professional and institutional connections, organizational skills). These communities used their nyati-based diaspora networks at regional, national and international levels, strengthened through professional ties, business links, and other associations (i.e., with non-profits, charitable organizations, individuals with deep pockets) to mobilize resources (i.e., funds, building material, land) for housing needs after the earthquake. Moreover, as the nyati mandal and nyati panch in a community are funded through household membership fees, nyati groups that are comprised predominantly of homeowners also had well-funded nyati mandal and nyati panch. After the earthquake well-funded nyati mandals were able to provide resources to their community members using in-house funds along with resources through other bonding networks. A Nagar nyati council member in Bhuj put it this way: … Organizations from outside such as Akhil Bhartiya Nagar Parishad [All India Nagar Council] came…They would also give us cash assistance. So like this we got a lot of assistance from our own community. They [All India Nagar Council] gave 1,000 rupees [US $23] cash assistance to all Nagar families immediately after the earthquake. About 6-7 lakhs [rupees; US $14,285 -$16,666] we 
Thackar / Luhana
Bonding & Linking • Nyati panch built 650 temporary housing units at GIDC with community funds. They paid Rs.12,000 (US $285) for each unit.
• Nyati panch paid Rs.15,000 for each squatter household for land on which Abhiyan NGO built houses Jain Oswal Bonding • Nyati panch set up Mahavir Bhukamp Rahat Samiti (Earthquake Relief Committee) to build 600 temporary housing units on community owned land.
• US based Oswal community group Jaina gave funding to build 250 permanent housing units for lowincome households in the Jain Oswal and Jain Vania communities at the rate of Rs.60,000 (US $1,428) per unit.
• Nyati panch helped member household get housing loans from banks.
Rajyagor
Bonding & Linking • Nyati panch made arrangements at their community center for temp shelter.
• It coordinated with Swaminarayan Religious Trust to build 98 temporary housing units.
• Nyati panch also petitioned local authorities for 180 plots close together at one of the relocation sites so that the entire community could live in close proximity.
Dalit N/A
• No organized initiatives for shelter needs.
Darbar / Jadeja Bonding • Nyati panch gave small cash assistance to 5-6 low-income renter households for housing from community funds.
Nagar
Bonding & Linking • Nyati panch set up tents on community land for 35 families.
• Nyati panch gave Rs.1000 to member households for immediate expenses after the quake 
Bhanusali
Bonding & Bridging • Nyati panch built 92 temporary housing units at GIDC temporary housing site.
• The panch raised funds from the diaspora -Rs.500,000 (US $11,904) from the Jain community based in the United States, and another Rs.500, 000 from All India Shri Kutchi Seva Bhanusali Trust, Mumbai.
Darji-SahiSuthar
Bonding & Linking • Nyati panch supervised construction of 100 temporary housing units at GIDC temporary housing site and paidR.4000 towards each unit using funds donated by a community member living abroad.
• It also helped members get permanent housing loans from Bank of India and Gruh Finance.
Kudwa Patel Bonding • Nyati panch formed Uma Cooperative Housing Society, bought land five kilometers outside Bhuj, subdivided the land into 225 housing plots, and gave one plot each to needy households (prior apartment owners) at the cost price of the land.
• Money for land was raised through donations within community members in India and abroad by Akhil Bhartiya Kudwa Patidar Samaj.
Koli N/A
Soni Bonding • Nyati panch built 100 temporary housing units on private land leased to the community by Soni family settled in the United Arab Emirates.
• The council obtained funding for units from the Jamnagar based Soni community organization called Ananda Bava Sewa Sanstha Trust.
• It also petitioned local authorities for housing plots located close together on relocation sites for their community members.
• The panch helped member households navigate the application process for public housing assistance.
Salat Bonding
• Nyati panch provided guidance to member households to procure financial help from local NGOs.
Sindhi Bonding • Nyati panch built a community hall just before the earthquake and thus did not have community funds left to help member households for housing needs after the disaster.
• The panch obtained financial assistance from the Sindhi diaspora in Bhopal (central India) to give cash assistance of Rs.7,000-8,000 (US $166-190) to low-income households for immediate expenses.
Hindu Khatri Bonding • Nyati panch built 36 temporary housing units at GIDC temporary housing site.
• The panch raised Rs.36,000 (US $857) for each unit from the Hindu Khatri diaspora in Mumbai.
• The panch built 20-22 permanent housing units on their community land for low-income renter households.
• It also gave cash assistance for immediate expenses and organized 60-70 tents from NGO groups for community member households.
Siddi N/A • No organized initiatives for shelter needs.
Kayasth Bonding • Nyati panch built 22 temporary housing units at GIDC temporary housing site.
• It obtained Rs.10,000 (US $238) for construction cost of each unit from Suresh Mehta, a prominent member of the community and a cabinet member in Gujarat state government. Jain Vania Bonding • Nyati panch built 100 temporary housing units.
Vanad
• It distributed Rs.10,000 ($238) per member household as cash assistance for immediate expenses.
• The panch also coordinated with Vardhaman Seva Kendra to build 85 permanent housing units for lowincome households within the community.
Maharaj Bonding
• The Nyati panch decided that the shelter assistance amount raised from the Maharaj community diaspora in Gujarat was low -Rs.50,000 ($1,190) -and sent it back.
Jain Oswal Bonding • Nyati panch arranged temporary housing in community guest house.
• The panch also coordinated with the Vardhaman Charitable Trust to build 26 permanent housing units for low-income households within the community. Source: Based on field interview data Notes: The currency exchange rate (US $1 = Indian Rupees 42) at the time of fieldwork is used. All figures are rounded to the nearest whole number.
ourselves gave. We got the money from the rent we collect on the use of our community center [in Bhuj]… Table 3 describes the amount of resources available and mobilized for housing needs through bonding, bridging and linking social capital networks by nyati groups in Bhuj and Bachhau.
Field interviews show that nyati communities such as Thackar, Oswal, Rajyagor, Nagar, Bhanusali, Darji-Sahi-Suthar, Soni, Khatri (Hindu) and Kayasth in Bhuj, and Thackar, Vania, Oswal and Soni in Bachhau all had resources available for short-term temporary housing needs through bonding networks, albeit in differing amounts and mobilized in different ways. For instance, the Thacker nyati panch in Bachhau organized the mass construction of 250 temporary housing units for participating households and paid 11,000 rupees (US $285) toward each unit using community funds obtained from their national level nyati panch. Similarly, the Hindu Khatri nyati panch in Bhuj built 36 temporary housing units for member households at the cost of 36,000 rupees (US $857) per unit, with funds raised from their wider community in Mumbai. The Darji Sahi Suthar nyati panch in Bhuj paid 4,000 rupees (US $95) towards the cost of each temporary housing unit, using funds donated by a community member living abroad. A nyati panch member explained:
…After the earthquake none of the old houses in our community survived…we made about 100 temporary houses for them [member households]...our houses were of 22,000 [rupees; US $523] each…the government had given 15,000 -12,000 [rupees; US $357-$285] per family for temporary housing plus 3000 [rupees; US $71] for toilets…and then…a community brother living abroad gave a private donation to us…5,000,000 [rupees; US $119,047]… Along with resources for temporary housing, a few nyati communities like the Oswal, Vania, Nagar and Kudwa Patel in Bhuj and Oswal and Vania in Bachhau also had differing amounts of bonding-based capital available for long-term permanent housing needs in the community through their nyati networks. Permanent housing resources were utilized to support low-income households in these communities. For instance, Oswal and Vania nyatis (two sects of the Jain religion) in Bhuj jointly sought and received a monetary donation from Jaina, a USbased Jain nonprofit. The donation funded the construction of 250 permanent housing units for widowed and low-income renter households in the two communities at a cost of 60,000 rupees (US $1,429) per house. Similarly, the Nagar nyati panch in Bhuj recruited the Hadke Seva Relief Foundation (a Mumbai-based Nagar community organization) to fund the construction of 21 permanent houses for low-income renter households in the Nagar community. The Kudwa Patel nyati community in Bhuj sought funds raised by the Akhil Bhartiya Kudwa Patidar Samaj (All India Kudwa Patel Community) through donations from the community diaspora in India and abroad. The funds were used to form a Cooperative Housing Society to buy a large piece of land five kilometers from Bhuj. The land was then divided into 225 housing plots and sold to lowincome Kudwa Patel households in Bhuj at cost, making the housing plots affordable to individual families and allowing them to live together in close proximity. A Kudwa Patel nyati panch member in Bhuj explained:
…For those who had needs after the earthquake, the community put a huge fund together [5,000,000 rupees; US $119,047]. The community had teams that did a survey to find out households needs…Our [national] community is called Akhil Bhartiya Kutch Kudwa Patidar [All India Kutch Kudwa Patidar]. The fund was put together by them…This money was used to buy plots to build houses. They [also] gave no interest loans to member households. A low-cost plot was acquired by the community and sold at the cost price to member households with no profit made… In Bachhau, the Jain Vania nyati community mobilized funds through the Vardhaman Seva Kendra (a Jain community organization) to buy land and build 85 permanent housing units for low-income Vania households. According to a nyati panch member:
…we have an organization…Vardhaman Seva Kendra. They bought the land and on that land 85 houses are already being built. It will be completed I think in another 3-4 months and then they [low-income households] will be able to shift [into it]. The weak households among us already did have their house [prior to the earthquake] but the thing right now is that they are not in a position to rebuild... Not all communities had similar resources available through bonding capital networks needed to assist with permanent housing needs. Instead, in nyati communities such as Rajyagor, Bhanusali, Darhi Sahi Suthar, Srimani Soni and Salat in Bhuj, highly educated nyati panch members with previous links to external institutions (i.e., government, banking) helped member households obtain housing loans or put together their public assistance application paperwork. However, for nyati communities such as Dalit, Vaghari, Khatri (Muslim), Koli, Siddi, Vanad in Bhuj and Dalit, Koli, Rabari, Bhil, Prajapati, Vadi, Suthar, Khwas, Vaghari, Khatri (Muslim) in Bachhau, where households are predominantly renters and/or squatters (i.e., 75 -100 percent), the amount of resources embedded in their bonding capital networks at the community level were highly limited and inadequate to meet either temporary or permanent housing needs.
Emergence of New Linking Capital
In both Bhuj and Bachhau, pre-and post-earthquake conditions were similar with regard to caste composition, socioeconomic demographics, scale of earthquake damage, and social capital levels. Yet, while the disaster triggered the formation of linking social capital between a local NGO, Unnati, and squatter communities in Bachhau that was employed for housing recovery, no such processes were observed in Bhuj. The presence of Unnati in Bachhau with interest in squatter housing issues enabled the emergence of new linking ties with squatter communities that helped squatter households access resources for housing recovery and overcome their lack of collective action and limited bonding-based social capital. In contrast, NGOs in Bhuj focused predominantly on low-income homeowners and renters, paying little attention to squatters.
In Bachhau, Unnati acted as a bridge between local government officials and squatter households, making coordinated efforts with the Bachhau Area Development Authority (local government agency in charge of reconstruction in Bachhau, henceforth called the Bachhau Authority) to reach out to squatter communities after the earthquake. Squatter groups in Bachhau are also socioeconomically the weakest nyatis, as indicated by their monthly income, lack of homeownership (i.e., 100 percent squatters), low levels of education, and limited amount of resources embedded in their bonding networks.
Unnati conducted local community meetings and worked informally with the Bachhau Authority to help establish a squatter housing recovery programme that was unique to Bachhau. The emergence of new linking networks with Unnati helped nyatis such as Dalit, Koli, Rabari, Bhil, Vadi and Vaghari to overcome their limited amount of bonding-based social capital by opening up previously unavailable access to public assistance and resources for housing recovery. The new links also provided the squatter communities an alternate leadership that was much more active on squatter housing recovery issues than their own nyati panch and enabled them to overcome their own lack of collective action. According to a Rabari nyati community leader in Bachhau:
…especially the NGOs have done good work…the organizations like Unnati who came from outside, worked as a bridge between the people and government…Many organizations were such who came in Rabari Vas [Rabari settlement] and took initiative to organize khatla [community] meetings within the Rabari community…they [NGOs] also went house to house and explained to the people how to build their house.
The squatter housing programme in Bachhau included public assistance ranging from Rs.60,000 to Rs.100,000 (US $1,428-$2,380) for squatter households with sanad (land tenure). Squatters who did not have land tenure but were able to prove their status as a Bachhau resident were eligible for land tenure and housing assistance of 55,000 rupees (US $1,309) under this programme.
Compared to Bachhau, local NGO outreach to squatter communities in Bhuj was nonexistent. In the absence of any outreach, linking capital networks between squatter communities and local NGOs or with the Bhuj Authority did not emerge in Bhuj after the disaster. According to a Koli nyati community leader: …they [local government] came and did survey and never came back. Everybody [Koli households] did repair themselves…government did not give anything…nobody ever bothered to come and ask what we need Moreover, in contrast to the squatter communities in Bachhau, linking capital networks also did not emerge for nyatis in both towns who had adequate amounts of resources available through their own bonding networks (e.g., Oswal, Nagar, Kudwa Patel in Bhuj and Leva Patel, Vania, Oswal in Bachhau) for temporary and/or permanent housing needs. These nyatis relied predominantly on resources mobilized through bonding social capital and repeatedly cited their lack of trust in external organizations and bureaucracy as the main reasons for the missing linking capital. For instance, a Nagar nyati council member in Bhuj stated, 'We did not have trust in local organizations (NGOs), we do not trust their construction…' As a Leva Patel nyati council member in Bachhau put it: …yes, the hassle of paperwork and so much corruption was there. Our community is not used to this bureaucracy, they are very straightforward [people] . If it does not work then let us do it with our own expense or do it after struggle. Today the system of getting work [done] within bureaucracy is very [trails off]…they [member households] cannot adjust. Yes, they will work hard without taking from anyone…
Concluding Notes
Research on social capital posits that social networks based on shared values, trust, and norms can facilitate collective action (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2002; Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1993) and that such social capital increases the ability of communities to recover after a disaster (Aghabakhshi & Gregor, 2007; Aldrich, 2012; Chamlee-Wright, 2006; Dynes, 2006; Ganapati, 2012; George, 2007; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004) , implying that the presence of social capital ensures collective community action after a disaster and enables recovery. Findings from the research reported in this article show that the role of social capital after disasters is not as clearcut and is often more nuanced than previous literature suggests.
First, this study demonstrates that all nyati groups in Bhuj and Bachhau have strong bonding networks that were mobilized in various ways and to different extents to meet postdisaster housing needs. Prior to the earthquake, households in Bhuj and Bachhau identified their community based on their nyati or caste group. Households formed social and economic relationships based on networks of trust within their own nyati. After the January 2001 Gujarat earthquake, communities in both urban areas relied upon their nyati networks to meet housing needs in two primary ways. One, because of high levels of internal trust within a nyati, households were able to pool together their temporary housing public assistance money. This allowed nyati panchs to use the combined funds to build temporary housing collectively. The mass construction of housing units made each unit financially economical and enabled member households to live together in close proximity as a community at the temporary housing sites. In addition, nyati panchs also used their nyati networks, particularly at the regional, national and international levels, to raise additional funds for short-term temporary housing and, to an extent, for long-term permanent housing.
Second, despite strong bonding networks, not all communities were able to take collective action to meet their housing recovery needs. The nyati panch played a critical role in organizing their community and the resources embedded in their bonding networks and mobilizing it towards recovery efforts. In communities where the nyati panch was actively involved in post-disaster recovery efforts, households were able organize themselves for collective action under its leadership. Yet, effective collective action was not necessarily the outcome in communities where despite strong bonding networks, lack of a strong leadership or resources led to an inactive or relatively less active nyati panch.
Third, nyati groups in Bhuj and Bachhau displayed differing amounts of social capital available for housing needs based on the resources embedded in their bonding networks. Socioeconomically strong nyati communities also had higher amounts of resources (i.e., money, professional and institutional connections, organizational skills) embedded in their bonding based networks compared to socioeconomically weak communities. On one end of the spectrum, nyati communities with the highest amounts of bonding-based social capital could tap into the resources embedded in their nyati networks for both short-and long-term housing needs. On the other end, for nyati communities that were comprised predominantly of renters and/or squatters, the amount of resources embedded in their bonding networks was inadequate for either temporary or permanent housing needs in the community.
Fourth, bridging networks at the community level among nyati groups in Bhuj and Bachhau are weak. Moreover, the presence of strong inward-looking bonding networks reinforced nyati identities in both Bhuj and Bachhau and left little room for bridging capital between nyati groups. Only the Bhanusali nyati in Bhuj could tap into their pre-existing bridging networks with the Jain nyati to mobilize resources for their temporary housing needs after the earthquake. Overall, bridging social capital at the community level was largely missing in both Bhuj and Bachhau.
Fifth, nyati groups who had large amounts of resources embedded in their bonding networks predominantly relied upon bonding social capital as opposed to bridging and/or linking social capital to meet their housing needs. Following the earthquake, nyati groups with the most bonding-based capital available made no attempt to establish bridging or linking capital ties for resource mobilization. Instead, they chose to rely almost exclusively upon bonding social capital to seek and mobilize resources for housing needs through diaspora networks at regional, national and international levels, finding little need to create new bridging or linking social capital.
Sixth, the disaster triggered the emergence of new networks between a small number of nyati groups in Bachhau, who are predominantly low-income squatters, and Unnati, a local NGO. The newly formed linking capital networks between the two were leveraged to meet squatter housing needs in Bachhau. In contrast, linking capital networks did not emerge in Bhuj after the disaster and, unlike Bachhau's squatter housing recovery programme, there were no such programmes in Bhuj for low-income squatter households. While the literature on social capital has observed that poor communities tend to have strong bonding and some level of bridging social capital but little linking social capital (Woolcock, 2000) , this finding is consistent with other scholarly observations that disasters can trigger the formation of social capital among impacted communities through the emergence of new networks (Ganapati, 2005 (Ganapati, , 2009 ). More importantly, the finding shows that the emergence of new linking networks helped low-income squatter nyatis in Bachhau to overcome their limited amount of bonding-based social capital and their own lack of collective action by opening up previously unavailable access to public assistance and resources for housing recovery. In contrast, squatter communities in Bhuj struggled to recover.
The concept of social capital has gained rapid traction in hazards scholarship in recent years. As discussed earlier, social capital is a useful tool to conceptualize community initiatives in post-disaster situations, yet the way it is used is often problematic as the focus is mainly on its positive aspects with little discussion of some of its larger critiques in the social capital literature. This study presents a more nuanced view of the use of social capital for post-disaster housing recovery. It highlights community contexts that can dictate collective action, the amount of bonding social capital available, and new resources that the emergence of linking capital networks can bring to communities. Overall, it shows that resources embedded in bonding capital networks and newly emerged linking networks were both successfully utilized by nyati groups in various ways to meet temporary and/or permanent housing needs in Bhuj and Bachhau after the earthquake.
For policymakers and practitioners engaged in formulating housing recovery policies and programmes in post-disaster situations, the article's findings suggest that policies that leave communities to lift themselves up by their bootstraps through the mobilization of resources embedded in social networks, without taking into account community contexts, are quite flawed.
Instead of lumping groups and communities together under a one-size-fits-all approach and the rhetoric of 'class and caste blind' recovery policies, the need is for public and private housing recovery efforts to coordinate with community-based initiatives immediately after a disaster in ways that support and strengthen such initiatives. For instance, public and private entities could document community needs and efforts for housing recovery in the neighbourhoods where they are working. This information could then be used to strengthen community initiatives through financial, material or other appropriate forms of support.
Study findings show that strong bonding networks do not ensure collective action, and communities cite lack of leadership or resources as the main reasons. However, new linking networks among local NGOs and squatter communities in Bachhau enabled the socioeconomically weak nyati groups to overcome the absence of collective action and limited amount of bonding-based capital. Future policy efforts could perhaps be directed in two ways. The first would be to enable linking networks with local citizen groups or NGOs for communities with weak leadership in order to provide them with alternate forms of external guidance. This can even be achieved through well-staffed information centres that can explain how to apply for public or private assistance and help communities navigate through the bureaucratic process. The second could be to encourage the formation of linking networks for socioeconomically weak communities that might have a limited amount of bonding-based capital available with various public and private entities (i.e., NGOs, banking institutions, micro finance, citizen groups). The new linking networks could fill the resource gap by directing such communities towards various forms and types of public and private assistance that could be utilized for housing recovery.
Finally, using social capital as an analytical framework addresses the question of postdisaster housing recovery outcomes merely in terms of the ability of communities to take collective action through social networks. In other words, the approach conceptualizes a community's ability to organize and take collective action, based on common values, shared interests, trust, and reciprocity within the community, but does not go further to explain the importance or the role of public policies, government actions, or private interventions to strengthen community capacities and their ability to take collective action. Although beyond the scope of this article, there is perhaps a need for future research that shifts the conversation from a narrow examination, limited to how community-based collective action impacts recovery, to a larger community-based perspective that considers a broader set of factors in the public and private realm that shape a community's capacity and ability to rebuild and recover.
